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ABSTRACT
I report a reversed Multi-Employee gift exchange laboratory experiment considering
immigrants and local workers. My main goal is to investigate the existence of statistical
discrimination. In the experiment, firms make wage offers using the strategy method,
while workers choose an effort level. Higher the effort, higher the cost to workers. There
is a partial mechanism available to workers for punishing or rewarding firm’s offers. Con-
sistent with the gift exchange hypothesis, workers provided more effort at higher wages
and performed a task as retribution. Immigrants provide slightly less effort than locals at
higher wages, but this is far to be significant. Firms showed a wage-effort positive relation
consistent with the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis. Firm’s non-binding effort requests were
honoured, resulting in increased overall number of tasks performed by workers. Finally,
no evidence of statistical discrimination was found in this study
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RESUMO
Este estudo corresponde aos resultados duma experiência de laboratório que usa o jogo
de troca de presentes invertido, com dois tipos de trabalhadores, imigrantes e locais. O
objetivo principal é investigar a existência de discriminação estatística. Nesta experiência,
as empresas fazem ofertas salariais usando o strategy method, enquanto os trabalhadores
escolhem um nível de esforço. Quanto maior o esforço, maior o custo associado. Existe
um mecanismo parcial disponível aos trabalhadores para punir ou recompensar as ofertas
da empresa. Consistente com a hipótese da troca de presentes, os trabalhadores esforçam-
se mais com salários mais altos e realizam uma tarefa em retribuição. Os imigrantes
oferecem menos esforço do que os locais com salários mais altos, mas isto está longe de
ser estatisticamente significativo. Para as empresas existe uma relação positiva esforço-
salário consistente com a Hipótese da Eficiência Salarial. Os acordos não vinculativos
da empresa-trabalhador foram cumpridos, resultando num aumento do número total de
tarefas realizadas pelos trabalhadores. Finalmente, nenhuma evidência de discriminação
estatística foi encontrada neste estudo.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Experiência de Laboratório; Jogo de troca de presentes com
vários trabalhadores; Esforço; Salário; Discriminação; Imigrantes;
CÓDIGOS JEL: C90; D80; D83; D90; O15; J71.
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RESUMEN
Reporto una experiencia de laboratorio usando el juego de intercambio de regalos in-
vertido, con dos tipos de empleados, inmigrantes y locales. El objetivo principal es inves-
tigar la existencia de discriminación estadística. En el experimento, las empresas hacen
ofertas salariales con el strategy method, mientras que los trabajadores eligen un nivel de
esfuerzo. A mayor esfuerzo, mayor costo para los trabajadores. Existe un mecanismo
parcial para que los trabajadores puedan castigar o recompensar las ofertas de las empre-
sas. De acuerdo con la hipótesis del intercambio de regalos, los trabajadores se esfuerzan
más con salarios más altos y realizan una tarea en retribución. Los inmigrantes ofrecen
niveles de esfuerzo menor al de los locales a salarios más altos, pero esto está lejos de
ser estadisticamente significativo. Las empresas presentan una relación positiva salario-
esfuerzo consistente con la Hipótesis de Eficiencia Salarial. Las promesas de esfuerzo
no vinculantes con la empresa fueron cumplidas, lo que resulta en un mayor número de
tareas realizadas por los trabajadores. Finalmente, en este estudio no existe evidencia de
discriminación estadística.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Experimentos de laboratorio; Juego de intercambio de regalos;
Esfuerzo; Salarios; Discriminación; Inmigrantes;
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Are you a discriminator?
A Lab Experiment: Gift Exchange and the impact of
information on the wages of immigrants
by
Luís Estevão Gonçalves García
I report a reversed Multi-Employee gift exchange laboratory experiment considering immi-
grants and local workers. Consistent with the gift exchange hypothesis, workers provided
more effort at higher wages and performed a task as retribution. Immigrants provide slightly
less effort than locals at higher wages, but this is far to be significant. Firms showed a wage-
effort positive relation consistent with the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis. Firm’s non-binding
effort requests were honoured, resulting in increased overall number of tasks performed by
workers. Finally, no evidence of statistical discrimination was found in this study.
1 INTRODUCTION
Are you a discriminator? Probably, the first thought as an answer it is that it depends.
It is well known that discrimination comes in many colours and flavours. For instance,
discrimination could be based on relative beauty, “where attractive people make more
money than middle attractive people, who in turn make more money than unattractive
people” (Andreoni and Petrie, 2008). Also, suppose gay candidates write down their sex-
ual orientation when sending a curriculum. In that case, they may not be penalised at the
first encounter, as found by Bailey et al. 2013 -“little evidence that employers discriminate
against gay men and straight individuals in their first contacts with job applicants”, but
this does not explain discrimination regards equal job conditions as payments, promotions
and rewards.
Discrimination exists, and it is not easy to measure. Moreover, some behaviours are
considered normal and vary across countries, and it may depend on preferences and be-
liefs, or racial segregation, that “is not just about race. It is also about access to jobs,
good schools, and decent economic prospects in life” (Orfield et al., 2010). Women earn
less than men, sometimes, not because there is pure discrimination on the firm side, but
1
LUÍS ESTEVÃO GONÇALVES GARCÍA ARE YOU A DISCRIMINATOR?
because women show less willingness to compete and negotiate a starting salary. More-
over, there is an effect of widening the overall male salary advantage, and the differential
bargaining payoffs explains for approximately 16% of men’s final starting salary advan-
tage (Gerhart and Rynes, 1991). However, differences in negotiation abilities are possibly
explained by nurture and not nature as pointed out by Andersen et al. 2018, “women do
not have an inherent, natural disadvantage in bargaining”.
Indeed, if a company see race or gender as a signal of productivity, statistical dis-
crimination could emerge as a result of an optimal choice when maximising profits. Fur-
thermore, this could influence the decisions about assigning resources to human capital
investment, where minority groups believe they will not get a fair return on their in-
vestments. It could be “explained as a self-confirming prophecy: minority workers are
unsuccessful because firms (correctly) believe that they likely have low skills and minor-
ity workers invest less in human capital since they (correctly) believe that they will be
disadvantaged in the labour market” (Norman, 2003). At the end, everyone is right.
Furthermore, reasons for statistical discrimination point to lack of information or pref-
erences, but even in the face of contradicting evidence and once the relevant information
is available, initial perceptions may persist. People may use physical appearance to form
impressions or choose associations (Castillo and Petrie, 2010). It leads to misconceptions
and the emergence of false ideas mostly target at groups of people from different countries
of origin, races, religions, gender or beauty. As there is no way to avoid this behaviour,
discrimination is just a consequence ‘Made in heaven’.
Keeping in mind that discriminated groups vary across countries, individuals and be-
liefs, in this thesis, I focus on two groups, locals and immigrants and explore the existence
of discrimination on an experimental labour market. More specifically, I used a Multi-
worker gift exchange game between a firm (Employer) and workers (Employees), and I
ran a Lab Experiment to observe local and immigrant average wages and the level of ef-
fort of both types of workers. In case firms offer different wages to locals and immigrants,
it is not clear that the gap wage is due to skills or status quo and prejudices. First, if skills
play a role, immigrants may get a lower payment because they put less effort or perform
worse than local workers, or on the contrary, they are paid more because they put more
effort or perform better than local workers. A laboratory experimental analysis allows
me to observe both firms and workers’ behaviour and check whether firms are rational
discriminators by using the average group characteristics to predict individual worker
performance, assuming no prejudice or hostile motives. Second, if stereotypes play a
role, cultural differences, or a simple segregation phenomenon are in place, we can say
we have pure discrimination. This laboratory study aims to study and distinguish pure
2
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discrimination from skills-based discrimination by checking the impact of giving firms
ex-ante information about whether a worker is local or immigrant and allowing firms to
set different wages while controlling for workers’ effort levels.
In my view, understanding discrimination between locals and immigrants can be help-
ful in two main aspects. On the one hand, immigrant workers can look for less biased
employers and improve their professional background profiles.
On the other hand, firms can learn how to avoid discriminatory behaviour due to false
ideas about immigrants in order to maximise profits and build more innovative teams.
Firms should have in mind that workers with migrant status are expected to introduce
more innovations, and they have positive associations to entrepreneurship (Nathan and
Lee, 2013).
In section 2, I explore the theoretical and empirical framework and review the liter-
ature. Section 3 presents the experimental design, the experimental procedures, and the
empirical strategy. Section 4 is devoted to the data analysis and results. At last, I present
the conclusions in section 5.
2 THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK & LITERATURE REVIEW
This section presents critical concepts first and then the related literature review. As
such, the literature review is not exhaustive but instead focused on the Gift Exchange
Game.
2.1 Theoretical and Empirical Framework
This study explores immigrant discrimination in an experimental laboratory labour
market. More specifically, it investigates the impact of revealing the worker’s nature (i.e.
local or immigrant) to the firm. Figure 1, shows the main elements of the theoretical and
empirical framework.
Let’s begin with the labour market, which usually is an ideal scenario to find discrim-
ination, especially statistical discrimination with imperfect information (Arrow, 1973).
Also, the labour market is where labour contracts involving a payment in exchange for an
effort level that depend on workers’ abilities exclusively occur. In a context of a labour
market, we also need to consider the Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis (see section 2.1.3), i.e.,
when workers have a belief of a fair wage and given that “the actual wage is less than the
fair wage, workers supply a corresponding fraction of normal effort” (Akerlof and Yellen,
1990).
3
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I recreated a labour market in the Lab using a Gift Exchange Game. This game shows
that firms may find it advantageous to pay a premium to acquire labour to get more bene-
fits through workers ‘reciprocation attitude, which is costly to them (Akerlof, 1982).
FIGURE 1: Theoretical and Empirical Framework: Immigration, Statistical Discrimina-




















Immigration is “an act or instance of immigrating specifically, travel into a country
for the purpose of permanent residence there” (Merriam-Webster., 2020) or “the action of
coming to live permanently in a foreign country” (Lexico.com, 2020). It leads me to the
concept of what is to be an immigrant.
I asked two people What is for you to be an immigrant?. Here are their answers, with
all the limitations and subjectivity that those imply:
Being an immigrant is to suffer prejudice against one’s nationality. It is to face the unwill-
ingness of public servants as if they were doing us a favour. It is to pay higher rents or to get
rent proposal declined. In small gestures, you can perceive the colonising thoughts of people
who call themselves siblings but still act like slave’s owners. 1
—MBA and Student in Portugal
1See Gomes 2013
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In essence, it is being just a human being like any other, who is motivated either by the desire
for better conditions or the quest of achieving their motivations and desires. I believe that
an immigrant is, due to his personality and motivated by his need, someone open to new
experiences and to novelty, someone who has the will to learn from work and who is open
to know other cultures, someone who is persistent, resilient and open to leap out from their
comfort zone.
—M.Sc. in Biochemistry and Researcher in Portugal
I guess it is not difficult for the reader to identify the statement of the immigrant. Being
immigrant involves beliefs from everyone about several characteristics such as race, eth-
nicity, gender, sexual orientation or stereotypes. Immigrants make countries more diverse
and challenge paradigms about race and ethnicity. Immigration is “making each racial
or ethnic group more heterogeneous as well as adding new ones to the mix” (Hochschild
et al., 2012).
FIGURE 2: The evolutionary tree of human races, Ethnicity and Immigrants. Adapted










Indeed, an immigrant can belong to several racial groups, ethnicity and shared values.
Figure 2, shows the racial groups based on the main continent of origin ( five major
groups, from Africans to Native Americans) and ethnicity as a “self-defined construct
that may be based on geographic, social, cultural and religious grounds” (Risch et al.,
2002). It is critical because people have a preconceived idea of what an immigrant is,
creating stereotypes as a result.
Moreover, immigration has consequences that vary across societies, and it is perilous
to generalise. For instance, the impact on the labour market depends not only on the
volume of immigrants entering the country but also on the level of their qualifications
compared to local workers (Borjas, 1999a, 1989).
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It is like a ritual that creates an idea, and sometimes fear, that immigrants affect local
wages and steal jobs. This idea about the adverse impact of immigrants on native em-
ployment opportunities has little evidence but, depending on the ethnic density, may have
a relatively small negative impact on local earnings and local employment (Borjas, 1994;
Borjas and Tienda, 1987). Other impacts are still on their way and may shape the labour
market in the long-run, which could take some decades to be observed. Immigrants flow
to many host countries like Germany, Portugal, France, UK, USA, and Brazil. There are
weak signals that countries may change the way they perceive immigration in the near
future. Conflicts like the one between Greece and Turkey or the USA-China Commercial
War may worsen locals’ perceptions towards immigrants, and this could happen at any
time without previous notice.
Furthermore, immigrants must deal with bureaucracy that is tailor-made to maximise
locals’ well-being. In contrast, immigration policies, forged under the premise that “ad-
mitting skilled immigrants would likely reduce the earnings of skilled native workers, but
would increase the earnings of other workers and native-owned firms by more, raising per
capita income in the native population” (Borjas, 1999b). This claim was supported some-
how, given that immigration led to a small increase on average wages of local workers
when immigrant’s density is low and after their arrival, they may take jobs or occupations
that do not match their skills (Dustmann et al., 2013). Also, new immigrants workers are
expected to have a small positive impact on local wages in the long run and negative im-
pact on old immigrant wages, because there is a “small but significant degree of imperfect
substitutability between natives and immigrants within education and experience groups”
(Ottaviano and Peri, 2012).
Additional, in some European countries, the skills of immigrants are underestimated.
This skill downgrading is mostly due to language and legal requirements that create nat-
ural barriers, forcing new immigrants to accept jobs more suitable for less-skilled locals
and cannibalise with previous immigrants that still struggle to fully integrate into the
labour market (Peri, 2016).
Under traditional circumstances, immigration is always an issue because there is no
unique position about its effects, raising uncertainty feelings. Countries through immigra-
tion policies try to minimise negative impacts as well as maximise positive ones. Many
policymakers use econometric models2 to predict the future based on ‘processed data’.
However, without access to the full ‘raw data’ and without considering that immigrants
2At this point, prudence is invoked, because econometric models are usually really good in explaining
the past, but may fail to predict the future. Moreover, good performance yesterday is not always a good
indicator of good performance tomorrow unless it survives Lucas’ Critique (Lucas, 1976). It seems that the
future is a deal for futurists and not for economists.
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are people and not only labour inputs, those models will predict biased estimates. It is
essential to take into account that this encourages some “immigrants to act in particular
ways and that some actions are more beneficial than others” (Borjas, 2018).
This lead to myopic views and biased results on the impact of immigration. In the
end, what we know about immigrants is what had happened after applying policies based
on these models. If we think immigrants will endanger the economy, and, as a result,
policymakers apply rules to control immigration, they will be happy if there is a negative
impact of immigration because that makes their policies right, a classic self-fulfilling
prophecy (Merton, 2000). If there is no negative impact, policymakers are also happy
because they feel they took the right measures.
Next, I explore the relationship with the labour market and discrimination.
2.1.2 Labour Market and Discrimination
The labour market is one of the economic markets, and it is where workers rent labour
services to firms. Labour services are rented due to the impossibility of buying and selling
people as in the time of slavery3. Nevertheless, the Labour market is where workers are
allocated to job positions, and contracts are used to bind these relations (Ehrenberg and
Smith, 2018). In Figure 3, it is possible to see the interaction between firms and markets.
Local workers play a role in such a world altogether with immigrant workers.
























The idea is to get a general picture of how firms must deal with markets to survive.
Also, these assertions help to circumscribe the role of immigrants in the labour market. In
3Unfortunately, in some cases, we observe a Modern sort of slavery replaced the old one.
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this sense, specific issues linked to the firm’s operation are seen as a replication of flaws in
pulling together the decision making process that involves elements such as wages, work-
ing conditions and level of employment itself (Cahuc et al., 2014b). It is important for
this study because these flaws are considered the trigger that awakes The Four Horsemen
of the Apocalypse, this time altogether with a different name: discrimination.
However, discrimination is a challenging and complex concept to tackle. Therefore, I
limit the scope of this study to wage discrimination. In this sense, I consider that exists
a wage discrimination when workers with the same observed socioeconomic characteris-
tics (i.e. education, IQ, EQ) and physical strength have different wages due to non-socio
economic (i.e. race, religion, sex or ethnic) characteristics and the differences are system-
atically correlated (Stiglitz, 1973).
At some level, personal characteristics such as race, ethnic background and sex, un-
related to productivity, are also valued on the market. Furthermore, “deliberate racial
segregation and discrimination in entrance to schools and colleges, deprivation of the
right to vote along social and sexual lines, and discriminatory taxation are all examples of
nonmarket discrimination” (Arrow, 1973).
There are a large number of theories that discuss discrimination. Table G.1 in Ap-
pendix G, presents some of these theories, especially those related to the labour market.
It has come to my attention that racial discrimination has served by far as a reference
point to deal with discrimination. To point out, in the United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
The term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or prefer-
ence based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing,
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any
other field of public life.
(United Nations, 1966)
Notably, recognising the negative impact of racial discrimination and condemning it
is a never-ending fight. Despite good intentions, the focus on racial discrimination has
neutral intent and has perverse effects because may lead to structural discrimination and
makes vulnerable other groups given the multiple grounds of discrimination (Mercat-
Bruns et al., 2016; Pincus, 1996).
Hence, after searching Theories of discrimination, Statistical Discrimination offers
the best framework, namely because through this lens it is possible to represent how firms
may come to discriminate among groups of workers, given the impossibility to observe
individual characteristics and with limited information about the individual’s groups.
8
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Under those circumstances, firms creatively look for signals. While it is possible
to get information about the education level, experience and performance on tests, it is
impossible to explain productivity entirely. Consequently, firms must search in secondary
sources to rely on, such as supplementary information or beliefs about a particular group
of workers’ average performance. Whereas the information is accurate or not, this may
create a persistent source of discrimination among groups. Accordingly, this affects the
decision workers make about investment in education, applying for certain types of jobs
or being forced to go into segregated groups to pursue a career (Cahuc et al., 2014a).
Statistical discrimination may also explain the self-fulfilling prophecy. It is vital to re-
alise that, sometimes, if firms are profit maximisers, the discrimination can be the optimal
strategy. Even for a policymaker, statistical discrimination can lead to improving welfare.
Regardless morality issues, sometimes, discrimination is based on rational economic be-
haviour. Therefore, we should look for answers in other fields, despite knowing that some
questions will remain unanswered (Aigner and Cain, 1977; Schwab, 1986).
With this in mind, I divided the workers into two types, locals and immigrants, and
I searched to find (if there is) statistical wage discrimination between them. Thus, be-
ing an immigrant is likely to be perceived as belonging to a minority group. For this
study, an immigrant summarises non-economic characteristics such as race, religion or
sex. Therefore, I approached the potential impact of information 4 on immigrant wages
and the behaviour of firms and workers. The focus is on firms’ behaviour, when offering
a wage to workers, and on workers’ behaviour when honouring their word after accepting
offers from firms.
Up to now, I have introduced immigration, the labour market, and discrimination as
general concepts, albeit a bit conventional, alongside wage discrimination and produc-
tivity. Before moving forward, it is key to bring to the front the concept of effort, rep-
resenting labour productivity. According to the Efficiency Wage hypothesis, either the
“services a labourer renders are a function of the wage he receives” (Stiglitz, 1976) or the
labour productivity is thought to depend on the real wage paid by firms. It means an effort
function takes the form of e(ω) and firms choose a wage that minimises labour cost per
efficiency unit (Yellen, 1984).
2.1.3 Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis
Amid the abundance of Efficiency Wage Hypothesis models, it exists one enriched
from other fields like sociology, personnel management and psychology: The Fair Wage-
4Reveling Worker’s nature, for example, being an ‘immigrant’ for this study. The firm is likely to
consider this fact a signal of productivity when framed to offer different wages
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Effort Hypothesis by Akerlof and Yellen 1990. The idea beneath is the aim to observe
human behaviour when expectations differ from reality. It could be seen as reciprocation
or the representation of the old saying: ‘You get what you deserve’.
The centre of the idea emerges the concept of Fair Wage (usually predetermined) and
its relation with the effort supplied. The effort e depends on the relation between the
actual wage ω and the fair wage ω∗, the fair wage-effort hypothesis says that,
e = min(ω/ω∗, 1) (1)
Equation 1 represents the effort supplied, denoted in units such that 1 is normal effort.
Following the same authors, this hypothesis explains the existence of unemployment. Un-
fortunately, any inference about this topic is beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless,
as a spoiler, when the fair wage ω∗ exceeds the market-clearing wage, unemployment
occurs.
Keep in mind that the Gift Exchange Game represents The Fair Wage- Effort Hypoth-
esis and that this type of interaction is considered a standard way to represent the Labour
Market in an experimental lab. I will come back to this in the Literature Review.
2.1.4 Laboratory Experiments
A laboratory experiment has three elements, as in Figure 4. First, an environment,
where monetary rewards allows to induce a specific value/cost configurations intended;
second, uses an Institution, defined by the description of messages and procedures of the
market as the experimental instructions, which are computerised and third, there is an
observed behaviour of the participants or subjects, usually as a function of the controlled
variables (Smith, 1994).
Thus, the first two elements of an Experiment constitutes the controlled variables. By
the same token, there are non-controlled variables such gender, allocative mechanisms
of institutions or real and idiosyncratic preferences, that will coexist with the subjects’
behaviour that will play a role uncovering issues to understand phenomena better (Davis,
2016).
It is essential to realise that laboratory experiments represents a technique often used
for testing theories, when its predictions are sensitive to specific attributes of subjects,
such as risk posture and the set of information, which it is hard to observe.
On the positive side, it is possible to design experiments that control these attributes
and directly measure them through ‘treatments variables’. Likewise, it allows to rec-
10
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oncile theory with empirical data or engage in dialogues to improve such theories or
policy-making, that is to say, that experiments resemble mediators among theorists and
policymakers (Roth, 1986). On the negative side, there are bad mediators, bad theories
and bad policymakers, which at some point in time, like false negatives, made it to pass
all security clearance checks.
Thereupon follows some criteria that should be considered in the picture when running
lab experiments expecting to predict economic theories. In the foreground, the problem
should be simple in itself and framed in a simple way for participants. The background
must provide adequate incentives and sufficient time for trial-and-error adjustments (Bin-
more, 1999). Since this study aims to investigate the existence of statistical wage dis-
crimination, not only the problem of incomplete information on individual characteristics
takes place straight-away but also its assessment. Surprisingly, in the light of theories
of discrimination, one can measure wage discrimination through the estimation of wage
equations, decomposition methods or directly through correspondence and audit studies,
methods based on the comparison of differences in variables, and experimentation in the
field and on the laboratory (Cahuc et al., 2014a).
Forthwith, I chose to conduct a lab experiment because it offers a suitable way to solve
this deadlock and allow me to have more control, create a fictional labour market and fa-
cilitates replications. Moreover, estimation tends to overestimate discrimination, not to
mention that it may influence explanatory variables (Cahuc et al., 2014a). Decomposi-
tion methods, while commonly used to analyse gender and racial discrimination, cannot
identify the sources and the problems of discrimination, for instance, they do not allow
for setting a clear difference between employment discrimination and wage discrimina-
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tion (Chen and Zhang, 2018). Furthermore, audit and correspondence studies involve
somehow deception, given actors performing a role or the use of fictitious resumes.
Indeed, lab experiments seems to be a good approach until now, albeit not unique.
Fields Experiments, whereas rarely reaches the controlled level attainable by lab experi-
ments, provide better external validity. In some cases, field experiments works as a good
complement to lab experiments. Neither field experiments nor lab experiments alone can
capture a complete representation of the real world or situation. Nonetheless, both give
qualitative insights that help comprehend better phenomena when using treatment vari-
ables (Charness, 2015).
To put it another way, I conducted a lab experiment because it allows me to create a
labour market and directly estimate the wage discrimination. The Environment and the In-
stitution will be held mainly constant, and only one variable will be changed exogenously
for the Institution.
Before moving forward, controlled variables in the Environment will be held constant
such as initial endowment, preferences, costs and well-defined incentives. For the Institu-
tion, the treatment variable will be the information regarding how a firm can set workers’
wage. Immediately, it follows the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis, the theory to be tested
under the lenses of the Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis through the Gift Exchange Game.
Additionally, firm’s behaviour indicates whether wage discrimination exists, under
statistical discrimination scope. Notice that firms may search, through secondary sources,
signals of productivity in order to estimate, on average, the productivity of a subject that
belongs to a minority group let us say, immigrants. I shall indicate that the average pro-
ductivity of a group estimated by a firm, can be the true productivity of that group, and, in
these cases, there is no wage discrimination. It is important to recall that effort depends
on the wage, and that takes the form of e(w), but also that firms search for productivity
signals and, consequently, they offer a fair wage. whether the fair wage offered by the
firm matches the worker’s fair wage is a matter out from the realms of this study given
that my focus is on the statistical wage discrimination.
Finally, the experiment in this study has some limitations. First, there is a trade-off
between internal and external validity. Second, the sample size reached is not enough
to get significance, and thus I consider the results a pilot. Besides, the empirical results
are less robust, although sufficient to get a tendency. Third, the productivity is not real
productivity, and there is a risk that in the Lab, the elicitation will not be enough to induce
subjects to perceive being an immigrant as a signal of different productivity. Last, the
pool of subjects is not composed necessarily by immigrants, and subjects could also hide
their true preferences. Notwithstanding these limitations, this study contributes to the
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literature on statistical discrimination using a Gift Exchange Game. Next, I show the
primary papers I used as a guide to structure this experiment.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Foundations and On the Lab
Beforehand, the literature search about Gift Exchange Games in laboratory experi-
ments, connected with wage discrimination and immigrants turned to be a dead end. It
represents an opportunity and is an Achilles heel, specifically, when it comes to immi-
grants. With this in mind, and because the goal was to run a lab experiment, literature’s
quest is focused on the Gift Exchange Game and laboratory experiments.
Therefore, I split the literature into two groups. First, in Table G.2 in Appendix G,
I show papers classified as the Foundations beneath the Gift Exchange Hypothesis and
its relation with the Efficiency Wage theory. Second, Table G.3 is a compilation of pa-
pers classified as On the Lab, since these are laboratory experiments with Gift Exchange
Games as the core of their experimental design.
In general, I found that Gift Exchange Games have been among us at least four
decades by now. It could be used to represent a Labour Market in laboratory experi-
ments, mostly because mimics labour contracts, which points out to a relation between
terms of exchange and norms, where wages depends on norms of workers’ effort, the
latter also depends on wages, at least partially, and workers’ effort depend on norms of
workers’ effort (Akerlof, 1982).
Another critical issue of Gift Exchange Games is that incorporates norms of fairness
and reciprocity and could generate efficiency gains, making firms and workers better off, if
they engage in reciprocal stable behaviour than otherwise (Fehr et al., 1998). In the same
way, it matches the efficiency wages theory, especially the Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis.
Similarly, four paradigms: the Dual Labour Markets Theory, Theory of Bureaucracy,
Theory of Groups and Equity Theory, all of them as Gift Exchange representations of the
Labour market (Akerlof, 1982). Up to this point, I just added reasons in favour of using a
Gift Exchange Game.
Despite Gift Exchange Game being an oversimplification of the real world, making a
simple game exchange provides more insights than designing a complex gift exchange,
whereas the latter suits better the real world, not necessarily leads to achieve more Nash
equilibria (Van Der Heijden et al., 2001).
In the opposite side, I shall bring the arguments against using the Gift Exchange ap-
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proach. Indeed, nothing is perfect. First, Gift Exchange may lead to different outcomes
when small institutional changes are made. If selfish behaviour is induced, behaviour con-
sistent with the Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis may emerge, but it will not be sustained, and
there might be outcomes where high level of reciprocal effort do not follow higher wages
(Rigdon, 2002). Second, Gift Exchange can be induced by subject’ strategic considera-
tions rather than by their social preferences, given that the subject’s background strongly
impacts their behaviour. Also can be seen as the result of a framing effect or a search for
clarity effect that takes place, making replication more difficult if not impossible (Char-
ness et al., 2004).
Nonetheless, the disadvantages, rather than being another Achilles heel, are just a
warning to avoid constructing a complex gift exchange, if there is not a clear value-added
on doing so, and to choose correctly which institutional changes should be considered,
the Environment and the subjects’ characteristics, not only to avoid changes in the nature
of the Gift Exchange itself but also to avoid unrealistic results that do not match the real
world at all.
Next, Table G.3 in Appendix G refer to Gift Exchange Experiments that inspired and
guided this design. In this set of experiments, subjects were separated into two roles,
and this is likely to be a fixed characteristic, coupled with the relation between wage and
effort.
From Hannan et al. 2002, it came the idea of keeping a partial punishment/reward
mechanism to consider the importance of subjects background (expected vs real charac-
teristics) and up to what extent nonbinding request is honoured by subjects.
In Abeler et al. 2010, Gift Exchange is analysed as a contract enforcement device. The
authors used a condition that elicited less effort and more violation of the norm of equity,
the latter as a prerequisite to gift exchange, although it is not clear if this was induced
deliberately or if it resulted from the treatment itself.
Perhaps, this experiment is a hybrid of the next three papers. First, I adapted the design
of Benndorf and Rau 2015 which uses a reversed Gift Exchange in a multi-employee
scenario. Second, Maximiano et al. 2007 uses the strategy method to elicit the wage-
effort relationship of every individual, which I also use here for the same purpose. Finally,
Jokipalo 2019 added some features such as the real effort. Even though it is beyond this
study’s scope, I used the same task and a similar methodological design. Overall, Gift
Exchange Experiments are simple to follow and can be extended to represent different
realities and it is widely accepted.
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3 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN, PROCEDURES AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
3.1 Overview: Gift Exchange
Reciprocation is a powerful psychological tool used in Negotiation (Siedel, 2014) and
the Rule of reciprocation says “we should try to repay, in kind, what another person has
provided us” (Cialdini, 2009). It is relevant because offering a wage in exchange for an
effort level is a negotiation between firms and workers, it has risks and involves consid-
erations about fairness and moral hazards. In fact, in the labour market what workers tell
they will do, may be quite different from reality (Fehr et al., 1993).
I created this experiment by different phases. First, I considered a typical gift ex-
change game as in seminal papers by Fehr et al. 1998 and Akerlof and Yellen 1990 intro-
ducing some adaptations. Second, I considered Maximiano et al. 2007 as a starting point
with some changes, and I tried to follow its reporting structure closely. There is a firm
and two workers instead of k workers (k>1 and specifically, one and four, in their experi-
ment). The firm has an initial amount of capital or endowment (E) available to make both
workers an offer, while workers have an initial value or wealth (W). Third, from Benndorf
and Rau 2015, I kept the idea of the reversed order and the cost table for workers. How-
ever, the authors used sequential moves in two stages, while in this experiment, firms and
workers move almost simultaneously in the first stage, and the sequential move appears
in the second stage.
Thus, firms offer wages to workers, w1 and w2, but those offers must be multiple of 5
and between 20 and 120. Another key point here is that firms must offer a wage using the
strategy method. i.e., firms must choose for each potential effort level, a correspondent
wage. It differs from Maximiano et al. 2007 because, in their experiment, workers are
the ones that make a contingent effort choice, while in this experiment is the firm. Corre-
spondingly, workers simultaneously decide the level of effort they want to provide as an
integer between 1 and 10, at cost c(ei) according to Table II, for i = 1,2.
An essential piece of information for both firms and workers is that the latter can
reject the firm’s wage offer in the second stage of this experiment. In Maximiano et al.
2007, workers cannot reject the firm’s wage offer. Moreover, workers in the third stage
can shirk. Therefore, this is the mechanism workers use to reward/punish the firms if they
feel the wage offered by the firm is not fair. More specifically, in my game, the workers
can reject the wage offer as punishment or accept, but not honour the deal and shirk in
the third stage. Nonetheless, even if workers shirk, there is no real impact for the firms,
although, may elicit the notion that if workers shirk, this impact their profits, then firms
may be tented to offer better wages in the hope that workers reciprocate.
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Four, Jokipalo 2019 introduced the real effort instead of hypothetical effort using the
task. As I intended to observe the firm’s behaviour, I used hypothetical effort as the
variable to analyse the wage- effort relation and the task is used to perceive if workers
will honour the deal given they can shirk with no consequences.




E + v ∗ (e1 + e2)− (w1 + w2) if Wage Offer is Accepted




W + wj − c(ej) if Wage offer is Accepted, with j ∈ [1, 2]0 otherwise (3)
The value of v represent the marginal product of effort and is set equal to 10. The cost
of effort function is given by Table II. The initial wealth parameterW and the Endowment
E, are set equal to 90, respectively, W = 90 and E = 90.
Standard theoretical predictions: The ‘typical’ Gift Exchange Game equilibrium is
given in Figure 5, where firms offer low wages and workers low effort. In this experiment,
the theoretical predictions remain the same, because firms and workers are assumed as
rational money maximisers as in Fehr et al. 1998. Keep in mind that workers should
always accept the offers because they will get positive payoffs (see Appendix H).
In this experimental game, the theoretical results under selfish, rational money max-
imisers individuals (especially the workers) should lead to firms’ non-discriminatory be-
haviour. Additional, if the Gift Exchange take place, then, in this case, a difference in
wages may result from the relation wage-effort rather than for discrimination due to non-
market conditions, let say, being an immigrant.
A relevant point in this experiment lies in testing whether a firm offers a different
wage for two workers that supply the same level of effort.
3.2 Experimental Design
I ran a lab experiment, and I used a Gift Exchange Game to represent the strategic
interactions between subjects type. The experiment design is based on the reversed Multi-
employee gift-exchange game (Benndorf and Rau, 2015; Abeler et al., 2010). A session
consisted of one round, with groups of one firm and two workers. Each round had three
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stages. In the first stage, the firm decided on a wage offer using the strategy method.
Almost simultaneously, workers decided on the effort level. In the second stage, workers
decided whether to accept the offer or not. In the third stage, those who accepted the offer
had two minutes to solve up an encryption task adapted from Benndorf et al. 2019 5.
The encryption task was repetitive and required no previous knowledge. During the
two-minute working period, workers (and firms) were free to surf the internet or otherwise
relax, given that they did not disturb other participants. Same as in Jokipalo 2019.
In the end, subjects answered an Exit Questionnaire (see Appendix B) that highlighted
some background subjects’ characteristics and beliefs. More specifically, the Exit Ques-
tionnaire was a survey with agree/disagree questions (measured on a scale) and some
questions related to the labour market and immigrants’ perception. Subjects answered
among several nationalities which one they think their role was. The questionnaire was
based on questions from the European Values Study 2017 (EVS, 2020).
In Table I, I show general features for both treatments and then, I explain some ele-
ments of the design.
3.2.1 Control and Treatment
The treatment in this experiment is the condition on how firms must determine worker’s
wages. Immigrant and local are the only two types of workers. I consider two treatments,
namely Equal Wage Treatment (EWT) and Different Wage Treatment (DWT). The first
one is referred to as the Control treatment and provides the baseline.
The baseline was given by the control sessions executed on December 2 and 9, while
Treatments sessions were executed on days 2, 3, 10 and 11 of December 2020.
5Orignal Task coded and freely shared by Benndorf et al. 2019 and available online in
https://github.com/vbenndorf/wedr. I only change the number of trials, repetitions and timing, to decrease
the overall time, the rest remain the same.
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TABLE I: Experimental Design. Adapted from Fehr et al. 1998.
Control (EWT) Treatment (DWT)
Parameters (marginal
product of effort, Initial
wealth, Endowment)
v=10, W=90, E=90 v=10, W=90, E=90
Feasible effort levels e ∈ [1, 10] e ∈ [1, 10]
Feasible wages w ∈ [20, 120] w ∈ [20, 120]
Wage determination Firms commit themselves
to a wage level using the
Strategy Method
Firms commit themselves
to a wage level using the
Strategy Method
Matching process Exogeneous and random Exogeneous and random
No. of firms (F) One One
No. of workers Type= L
(Local)
One One
No. of workers Type= I
(immigrant)
One One
Information conditions v, W , E, N , L, I are com-
mon knowledge; identity
of subjects is unknown
v, W , E, N , L, I are com-
mon knowledge; identity
of subjects is unknown
Condition on Wages (i.e.
restrictions)





Convergence towards w1 =
20 and w2= 25 or w1 = 25
and w2= 20; e1=e2=1
Task Word Encryption task
with Double Randomiza-
tion(WEDR)




The difference between the control and the treatment is that firms are framed to select
a different wage (w1 6= w2) for locals and immigrants types in the latter. While, in the
control treatment, firms have to give the same wage (w1 = w2) to each worker type. Given
that firms use the strategy method, they may incorporate in their decision-making process
that she has to select several wages. It is relevant to mention that participants may be
tempted to ignore the condition when setting the wages (i.e. equal in DWT or different in
EWT) in each treatment, to avoid this, the experiment has a checker that will prevent any
possible attempt to not comply with the conditions.
One challenge that arose was to induce preferences and beliefs regarding being an
immigrant. In particular, there is no reason to think that subjects in the Lab will take as a
signal of productivity being an immigrant because there is no reason to believe that exists
any distinction between local and immigrant workers a priori. For instance, subjects
get information that they can interpret as a signal of productivity, the gender or the skin
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colour, and then, comparisons between men vs women or whites vs blacks, give them a
clear signal of whom may have less productivity and this is not necessarily wrong if they
get lucky.
To solve this, I included in the instructions that there is two productivity levels Z
for workers: lower and higher, which has a Bernoulli distribution such Z ∼ Be(0.5),
where a success is to get a higher productivity worker (e ∈ [6, 10]), while a failure is to
get a lower productivity one (e ∈ [1, 5]). Keep in mind that this does not rule out that
firms can get both workers with lower productivity, given that there is 25% probability to
get both workers with lower productivity, 50% probability to get one lower productivity
worker and other of higher productivity, and 25% probability to get both workers with
high productivity.
Another critical information is that the experiment is a Between-Subjects Design (BS)
given that allows me to have a clean design and control over it, besides this is a short and
simple experiment. However, to avoid learning effects, the experiment consists of a one-
shot game. The only explanatory variable is the treatment variable that in this case, i.e.,
the possibility of setting a different wage for each type of worker.
3.2.2 Earnings
Average earnings were about 107 Experimental Currency Units (ECU) for about 37
minutes approximately. The combination of wage and effort determined outcomes and
monetary payoffs for each triplet of subjects in a round. Each firm was given an Endow-
ment of 90 ECU and each worker started with a Wealth of 90 ECU. The payoff functions
are adapted from Abeler et al. 2010 and Maximiano et al. 2007 and were given by:
πi(w, e) =

90 + 10 ∗ (e1 + e2)− (w1 + w2) if Wage Offer is Accepted




90 + wj − c(ej) if Wage offer is Accepted, with j ∈ [1, 2]0 otherwise (5)
where πFirm represents the firm’s Payoff, uj the Worker’s Payoff j, ej denotes the
worker’s effort j, wj is the Wage of Worker j, and c(ej) is the cost of effort that depends
on the effort. Wages were limited to the range of 20 to 120, inclusive and by multiples of
5. Effort was chosen from {1, 2, . . . , 10} and the cost of effort is shown below in Table
II:
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Effort Level e (units) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cost c(ej) (ECU) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 13 16 20
TABLE II: Cost of effort
3.2.3 Matching Procedures and Participants’ profile
This experiment is a one-shot, using random matching process to avoid self-selection.
After the subject’s arrival, I created groups in multiples of three. In Figure 6, as one 6
example, there are three groups (black, purple and blue) for both, the Control and the
Treatment.
It is relevant to mention that the instructions are neutral for the EWT, but framed for
DWT. Recall that in the treatment DWT firms set a different wage to locals and immi-
grants, while in the control treatment, firms have to set an equal wage. The Experimenter
emphasises these conditions when reading the instructions, and there is a checker in the
software itself to remind the participants if they do not comply with these conditions.
There was no need to use control questions, but there were examples in the instructions
to check if subjects understood the payoff functions and the task activity. Additional,
altogether with the fact that this experiment is only a one-shot and supporting the idea of
avoiding learning, no trial periods were carried out, except for the task.

















6Using n!(n−r)! , where n is the number of subjects, r is the number of categories, in this case, three for
Control and Treatment, no repetitions are allowed and the order matters. Thus, 504 possibilities in this
example.
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In general, subjects profile for both, Control-EWT and Treatment-DWT, were similar
according to Table III. Nevertheless, the percentage of women was higher in treatment
DWT, and the average age was higher than in EWT. Participants were mainly Portuguese
but Brazilian, Colombian, Indian, Iranian, and Slovakian were among the nationalities.
Also, the education level was more diversified, and the average wage and effort dif-
fered from the expected.
TABLE III: Expected vs Real Subject’s Profile
Characteristic Expected Control (EWT) Treatment (DWT)
Gender 50% women 47% women 67% women
Age (Y) Y ∈ [20, 40] Y ∈ [18, 54] Y ∈ [18, 40]
Level of Education 50% 2nd Cycle 20% 2nd Cycle and 80%
1st Cycle
33% 2nd Cycle, 57% 1st
Cycle and 10% 3rd Cycle
No. of firms (F) 40 5 7
No. of workers Type= L
(Local)
40|40 5 7
No. of workers Type= I
(Immigrant)
40|40 5 7
First Language English 93% English 71% English
Second Language Portuguese and Spanish 80% Portuguese, 7%
Spanish and 20% Other
95% Portuguese, 24%
Spanish and 10% Other
Religion 50% Roman catholic and
50% Other
33% Roman catholic, 47%
Not Religion and 20%
Other
43% Roman catholic,
48% Not Religion and 9%
Other
Origin 50% Portugal, 30% Brazil,
20% Other
67% Portugal, 13% Brazil,
20% Other
86% Portugal, 9% Brazil,
5% Other
Avg. Wage | Avg. Effort 20 | 1 L: 59 | 7.2; I: 55 | 3 L: 60 | 6.3; I: 67 | 7.2
What about the values? ?
Impact† on development 3.3 3.9 3.8
Religiosity 1.3 1.7 2.2
Political‡ (Left-Right) 2.1 2.3 2.1
Take Jobs 5.5 7 8
Increase Crime 5.1 7.1 7.4
Stein for Social System 5.2 7.8 8
Traditions 5.2 5.5 5.2
? Expected values from the European Values Study 2017 (EVS, 2020)
† From 1 to 5
‡ Converted to 1 to 4 from 1 to 10
3.3 Experimental Procedures
Eight laboratory sessions were conducted at XLAB - Behavioural Research Lab at
ISEG-Lisbon School of Economics & Management, Universidade de Lisboa, in Decem-
ber 2020. A total of 367 people were recruited mainly from the participant pool of the
XLAB through ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). I also sent invitations via email, and I made a
Video (see Appendix D). The experimental protocol is single-blind, where only the Ex-
perimenter will know the type of each subject.
7One participant did not belong to the pool
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No participant was allowed to participate in more than one session. After arrival, once
participants were seated, groups of three participants were created randomly. One partici-
pant was randomly assigned the role of a firm, and the others were randomly assigned the
role of workers. In the experiment, subjects earned points expressed as ECU.
The payments procedures are quite simple. At the end of the session, the Experi-
menter asked subjects to come to receive their payments. In each session, subjects began
with an initial value of 90 ECU. It increased if they made profits, and it decreased if they
experienced losses in the experiment. Subjects always could rule out the possibility of
making losses by their own decisions. Subjects were paid to play a game, to solve a task
and to answer a questionnaire. The game was incentivised with ECU, and the question-
naire was a prerequisite to get the payment. While the task was not incentivised, it was an
integral part of the experiment.
The conversion rate between ECU and Tickets was 10 ECU = 1 Ticket. The average
payment per-subject was 13 tickets, that granted subjects to participate in a Lottery (see
Appendix E). The prize was a gift card with 100 EUR. The Lottery was made at the end
of all sessions and was public. This prize draw was on the 16 of December at 14:00 at the
XLAB.
The experiment used the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and the Gift Exchange
code was adapted from Siang et al. 2014. Subjects started with on-paper instructions (see
Appendix A). The z-Tree codes versions are available under request (see Appendix C).
3.4 Empirical Strategy
The data obtained from this experiment are the wages firms offered to workers and
their effort. Additional, it was recorded the number of workers that rejected or accepted
those offers. For those workers who accepted the offer, the number of tasks performed
indicate if workers honoured the nonbinding contract.
Next, follows the Hypothesis testing, the sample size, and the test’s power, relevant
elements to answer the research question.
3.4.1 Hypothesis Testing: Null and Alternatives
I defined hypothesis as there are no assumptions on the distributions and variance
between the two variables. Therefore, I applied the standard non-parametric test, albeit
not exact, Wilcoxon Mann Whitney test (Schlag, 2011). Also, I conducted regression
analyses controlling for the impact of demographics on the wages-effort to know if there
is any difference regarding sex or education level.
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I defined the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1: Average wages of immigrants is significantly lower than average
wages of locals.
H0 : wI − wL ≥ 0
H1 : wI − wL < 0
I made a One-sided test. The variable of interest is the wage that firms offered to
workers. The main assumption is that exists a gap between the local and the immigrant
wage that closes once the immigrant is fully integrated into the labour market, but some
immigrants never close the gap (Anderson and Huang, 2019).
HYPOTHESIS 2: Average effort of immigrants is equal to average effort of locals.
H0 : eI − eL = 0
H1 : eI − eL 6= 0
I made a Two-sided test. The variable of interest is the effort of each type of worker
supplied. Effort in this study is ‘productivity’. If efforts levels are different, this could
indicate that any difference in wages not necessarily is due to discrimination. Also, there
are no reasons to believe that immigrants will offer more or less effort than locals.
HYPOTHESIS 3: Immigrants perform equal number of tasks than locals.
H0 : TI − TL = 0
H1 : TI − TL 6= 0
I made a Two-sided test. The variable of interest is the number of tasks performed by
workers after accepting a wage offer. Again, there are no reasons to believe that immi-
grants will perform more or less tasks than locals. If they do, this may explain part of the
differences in wages.
HYPOTHESIS 4: Firms offer significantly lower average wages to immigrants than
to locals workers, for the same level of effort.
H0 : E(wI − wL|eI = eL) ≥ 0
H1 : E(wI − wL|eI = eL) < 0
23
LUÍS ESTEVÃO GONÇALVES GARCÍA ARE YOU A DISCRIMINATOR?
I made a One-sided test. The variable of interest is the Wage that firms offered to
workers. This hypothesis is to see if there is Statistical Discrimination. Also, I made a
regression to find the relation wage-effort. The story behind this is that some workers with
similar levels of education, i.e the immigrants in High-Income Countries, tend to earn less
than their local counterparts within the same occupational category (Amo-Agyei, 2020).
3.4.2 Sample and Power-Efficiency
It is crucial mention possible issues related to dependency between observations,
given that effort depends on the wages a firm offers and the wage depends on the level of
effort a workers offers, nonetheless, each observation is independent because the decision
that a triplet makes it does not affect the decision of other triplets.
Also, there is two independent samples, Control and Treatment. The independent
observation will be the decision of each individual obtained from each triplets. In the
sample of 36 subjects, I get 12 observations for local type, 12 for immigrants, and 240
(12x2x10) for firms, and the latter uses the strategy method to offer a wage for each level
of effort. Table IV shows the number of participants n and the observations obtained by
each type.






Local (L) Effort n=5 n=7 n=12
Obs=5 Obs=7 Obs=12
Immigrant (I) Effort n=5 n=7 n=12
Obs=5 Obs=7 Obs=12
Firm n=5 n=7 n=12
Both Obs=120 Obs=120 Obs=240
Wage L Obs=50 Obs=50 Obs=100
Wage I Obs=70 Obs=70 Obs=140
To define the number of participants I used as a point of reference an efficiency power
of 80% for a double-sided test with 5% significance level in a BS and in Field Gift Ex-
change experiments in Bellemare et al. 2016, where the minimal sample size required
ranges from 74 to more than 400 subjects with low-noise data, and 130 to more than 400
with high-noise. Also, I used the package for STATA, PowerBBK, which is useful for
simulating the minimal necessary sample size to reach the expected level of statistical
power or ex-post compute the statistical power of a design. In this experiment with n=36
subjects, the power should reach around 26% approximately. In Figure 7, it is possible to
see a statistical power simulation of the BS experiment. I kept the parameters fixed, and I
only changed the allocation up to 45% to the control group given that 5 out of 11 sessions
were control in this study.
Additionally, another point of reference was to think the size of the sample as if would
have a standard normal distribution, in which case the Equation 6 would be handy. This
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FIGURE 7: Statistical power of between-subjects in economic experiments Source:
STATA PowerBBK (Bellemare et al., 2016)
approach has limitations because it is unlikely to have a normal distribution. After all, the
distribution is unknown. Nonetheless, as an example using an α of 5% and a Power of
80%, tα/2=1.96 and tβ=0.84, indicates that the n needed to detect a change of one (one-
half) standard deviation in the outcome variable is n∗ = 16 (n∗= 64) observations in each
group (List et al., 2011).




Equally important is the power of the test. In general, parametric tests such the t-
test are preferred for big sample size, but a normal distribution is required. While non-
parametric tests are more suitable for the real data without losing much power, for in-
stance, the Mann-Whitney U test:
If the Mann-Whitney test is applied to data which might properly be analysed by the most
powerful parametric test, the t-test, its power-efficiency approaches 3/π = 95.5% as N in-
creases and is close to 95% even for moderate-sized samples. It is therefore an excellent
alternative to the t-test, and of course it does not have the restrictive assumptions and require-
ments associated with the t-test.
(Siegel, 1956)
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4 DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
In the previous section, I defined the Null Hypothesis that is my starting point. Next, I
used the Mann-Whitney U Test as the Statistical test because it is appropriate for analysing
data with two groups (i.e., local and immigrant) that constitute two independent groups
and the variables wage and effort also constitute an ordinal measure at best. Using STATA,
I ran the Mann-Whitney U test for the sample distribution using ranksumex (n ≤ 25).
Also, I used the standard significance level α = 5%. At last, I explored the data to get
better insights about the participants.
The analysis is carried out separately for workers and firms. Workers control the
variables effort and number of tasks performed while firms control variable wage.
4.1 Workers
RESULT 1: Average wages of immigrants is higher than Average wages of locals,
but this difference is not statistically significant.
It is possible to observe in Figure 8 that the average local wage offered in treatment
EWT is lower (59, n = 5) than the mean wage in treatment DWT (60, n = 6). Similarly,
the average wage of immigrant offered in treatment EWT is lower (55, n = 3) than the


























FIGURE 8: Average wages by treatment and worker
The average local wages in both treatments is lower (60, n = 11) than the mean of
immigrant wages (63, n = 9). Although, this is not statistically significant (one-sided
Mann-Whitney Test, p < 0.46) given the form of the distribution for each type of worker
as it could be observed in Figure 9, where the median is the same for both type of workers
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in each treatment, and also the wage median in EWT (60, n = 8) is lower than the median
in DWT (62.5, n = 12).









FIGURE 9: Distribution of wages by worker and treatment.
In this case, the test fails to reject the Null Hypothesis at 5% significance level, and
within this sample, no evidence supports that immigrants will obtain lower wages than
locals. Moreover, the probability of the local’s wage being greater than the immigrant’s
wage is 0.485.
RESULT 2: Average effort of immigrants is lower than Average effort of locals, but
this difference is not statistically significant.
Figure 10 shows that the average effort of local in treatment EWT is higher (7.2, n =
5) than the mean effort in treatment DWT (6.3, n = 6). On the other hand, the average
effort of immigrant in treatment EWT is lower (3, n = 3) than the mean effort in treatment
DWT (7.2, n = 6).
Also, the average local’s effort in both treatments is higher (6.7, n = 11) than the mean
of the immigrant’s effort (5.8, n = 9). However, this is not statistically significant (Two-
sided Mann-Whitney Test, p =0.63) given the form of the distribution for each worker as
it could be observed in Figure 11. Moreover, the median for locals in EWT (7, n = 5) is
higher than the median in DWT (6, n = 6), while for immigrants the median in EWT (1,
n = 3) is lower than the median in DWT (7, n = 6).
In this case, the test fails to reject the Null Hypothesis at 5% significance level, and
within this sample, no evidence supports that immigrants put lower effort than locals.
Although, the probability of local’s effort being greater than immigrant’s effort is 0.566.
RESULT 3: Immigrants performed higher number of tasks than locals, but this dif-
ference is not statistically significant.
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FIGURE 10: Average effort by treatment and worker









FIGURE 11: Distribution of effort by worker and treatment.
It is possible to observe in Figure 12 that the average number of tasks performed in
treatment EWT is lower (5, n = 5) than the mean of tasks performed in treatment DWT
(5.7, n = 6). At the same time, the average for immigrant in treatment EWT is lower (5.7,
n = 3) than the mean in treatment DWT (5.8, n = 6).
The average number of tasks performed in both treatments for locals is lower (5.4, n =
11) than the mean for immigrants (5.7, n = 9). However, this is not statistically significant
(Two-sided Mann-Whitney Test, p = 0.63).
Thus, the test fails to reject the Null Hypothesis at 5% significance level, and within
this sample, no evidence supports that immigrants perform a higher number of tasks than
locals. Also, the probability for locals to perform a higher number of tasks than immi-
grants is 0.434.
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Includes only workers that accepted the wage offer.














Average Number of Tasks performed
FIGURE 12: Average Task by Worker and Treatment
4.2 Firms
Theoretical predictions state that firms should offer the minimum wage of 20 ECU for
both workers in treatment EWT and minimum wage of 20 ECU for one Worker and 25
ECU for the other worker in treatment DWT. Firms that expect higher than the minimum
effort by workers and possibly gain in efficiency may pay higher wages.
In general, firms behaviour can be described using a monotonic function. This is
supported by the Spearman rank correlation (ρ) between effort and wages that is around
0.68 and highly significant (obs=200, p<0.01). Also this relationship remains true across
treatments and types. The ρ is approximately 0.35 (obs=80, p<0.01) for EWT and 0.92
(obs=120, p<0.01) for DWT. By the same token, for locals is around 0.58 (obs:110,
p<0.01) and 0.81 for immigrants (obs:90, p<0.01). In EWT ρ is roughly 0.21 for locals
but not significant (obs=50, p<0.15), while for immigrants ρ is around 0.61 and signifi-
cant (obs= 30, p<0.01). In treatment DWT ρ is almost 0.93 for locals (obs= 60, p<0.01)
and 0.92 for immigrants (obs= 60, p<0.01).
Thus, firms are entirely reciprocal in this sample. Only one participant offered the
minimum wage of 20 ECU for all effort levels, and another participant had an erratic
behaviour without a clear pattern, and the minimum wage was likely reached by chance.
In these cases, only local workers accepted the wages, while the immigrants rejected it,
and both types of workers put the same level of effort.
It is essential to say that only firms’ decisions that match a worker acceptance survived
the “cleaning process” because if workers reject the wage offer, the effort level is zero
and therefore, no wage matches that level. Forty observations from 3 firms were dropped
(10 for local and 30 for immigrants). Thus, the erratic firm’s wage offers survived the
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“cleaning process” and impacted the average wages for the effort levels of 3 (increased)
and 7 (decreased) specifically.
The participant with erratic behaviour has an impact in the results, however. The
Spearman rank correlation between effort and wages is around 0.68 decrease until ap-
proximately 0.47 and still highly significant (obs=240, p<0.01), yet the relationship across
treatments and types holds. But the ρ for immigrants in EWT decrease down to 0.23 from
0.61, and not significant (obs= 50, p<0.11).
RESULT 4: Firms offered higher average wages to immigrants than to locals workers,
for the same level of effort in 9 out of 10 levels of effort but these differences are not
statistically significant.
















1 26 28 0.03† 0.30
2 31 32 0.54 0.50
3 46 40 0.39 0.54
4 43 44 0.44 0.48
5 50 51 0.46 0.52
6 57 58 0.46 0.49
7 60 71 0.16 0.36
8 72 74 0.43 0.53
9 79 92 0.29 0.42
10 86 97 0.43 0.48
5.5 55 59 0.25 0.45
Note: For each level of effort: Obs=11 for local type and Obs= 9 for immigrant type. Values
are rounded for means, p-values and probabilities. †Two sided p-value =0.09
Average wages of immigrants (59, n = 90) are higher than average wages of locals (55,
n = 110) for the same level of effort. This result is not statistically significant to support
any difference between local and immigrant wages offered by firms (Mann-Whitney: z =
-1.145, p = 0.2523) at a significance level of 0.05.
Based on these results, the treatment DWT does not significantly impact wages for
locals and immigrants. Therefore, the test fails to reject the Null Hypothesis.
4.2.1 Relationship Wage-Effort and Regression Analysis
The sample in this study shows a pattern for firms that is not consistent with the
Efficiency Wage Hypothesis where the goal is to minimise labour cost per efficiency unit,
but it is aligned with the worker’s belief that exists a function that takes the form e(ω).
In this case, firms do not appear as those types that want to minimise costs but do offer
wages that exceed the clearing wage of 20 ECU for both workers in treatment EWT and
20 ECU for one worker and 25 ECU for the other worker in treatment DWT.
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Figure 13, shows a positive relationship between wage and effort for locals and immi-
grants in line with the ρ that is already known to be positive. I included a linear fit and a
quadratic fit, and I add some random noise to have a better image of the pattern. The fit





























Include only wages accepted. N=11; Obs: Locals=110 and Immigrants=90
Relationship Between
Wage and Effort
FIGURE 13: Average effort by worker
The regression analysis shows a positive relation wage-effort for both treatments. In
Table VI the regression effort-wage results for locals and immigrants gives a R2 around
0.38 and 0.66, respectively.








Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Moreover, for locals, the constant is likely to be different from zero. The exciting
thing is that for locals changes in their wages only explain around 38% of changes in
effort they offered, while for immigrants, wages explain up to 66% of the changes in
effort they supply. Table VII, presents a regression on immigrant wages as a dependent
variable and local’s wage and sex as independent variables. The regression coefficients
are statistically significant, indicating that they are different from zero as the constant for
undergraduate males. Here I only included the DWT. The EWT treatment has a R2 = 1,
but this is not a surprise because wages must be set equal.
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Undergraduate/Female Undergraduate/Male Master/Female
Wage Local 0.927∗∗∗ 0.918∗∗∗ 1.007∗∗∗
(0.0364) (0.0397) (0.0642)
Constant 1.360 5.075∗ -1.016
(2.342) (2.232) (4.890)
Observations 30 20 10
R2 0.959 0.967 0.969
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
TABLE VII: Regression Wage immigrant by Treatment: DWT, Education and Sex
5 CONCLUSION
In this experiment, I used a reversed Multi-Worker Gift Exchange game to find Statis-
tical wage discrimination between two types of workers (locals and immigrants), in two
scenarios (Equal Wage Treatment and Different Wage Treatment). The findings replicate
results in previous Gift Exchange Games in which a Gift-Exchange occurs, usually for
both sides. In average, workers in this study offered more than the minimum effort level
and firms more than the minimum wage.
On the worker’s side, immigrant’s wages are slightly higher than local’s wages. The
opposite happens for the effort level, where local’s effort is slightly higher than the im-
migrant’s effort. However, when I explore the data by treatment, a pattern higher-effort-
higher-wage emerge. Moreover, the results are not statistically significant neither by type
nor by treatment. Regarding the tasks performed by the workers, in both treatments,
immigrants performed slightly more tasks than locals, but again this is not statistically
significant. I believed that some positive relation between effort and the number of tasks
performed by workers would emerge, but after running a regression (constant=5.5 statis-
tical significant, indicating that is likely to be different from zero), the R2 was zero.
On the firm’s side, the strategy method showed to be effective in eliciting the relation
effort-wage. The pattern higher effort-higher wage emerged, aligned with the Efficiency
Wages Hypothesis and the empirical results in several studies (see Table G.2 and G.3) in
which firms offered higher wages to higher effort supply.
Also, the mean differences have not statistical significance, and the medians were the
same. Then no evidence of statistical wage discrimination was found in this study. Impor-
tant to say that from the workers’ side statistical wage discrimination did not arise either
(at an effort level of 5 the probability that the local’s wage was Higher than immigrant’s
wage is 0.75 vs 0.52, and at an effort level of 7 the probability is 0.43 vs 0.36, given the
number of observations), as expected given that there is no statistical discrimination from
the source of the wages.
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All things considered, these results must be interpreted with caution, and some limi-
tations should be highlighted in this pilot:
First, the Bernoulli Distribution was not considered a relevant signal of productivity
to differentiate workers. However, in a session, one participant raised a concern about the
difference between workers, and after mentioning the Bernoulli Distribution, the partici-
pant formed a belief (not sure what was that belief), even with its general failure in trig-
gering subjects to differentiate workers. Another participant asked how to know which
workers should get a better wage or what size of the difference should be and what was
a correct wage to set. In the same session, another participant said ‘He can not tell you
that’ and my answer was ‘Up to you’.
Therefore, it is necessary to put a clear signal. It was also ‘too’ evident for participants
that the experiment is about discrimination, although it was never mentioned. They did not
reach to statistical discrimination, but I will speculate that they hid (maybe unconsciously)
their true preferences because they did not want to give any signal of discrimination. If
discrimination exists, just as a virus, hides in sanctuary sites.
Second, the size of the sample and observations are like a standard limitation. In
this study, I still encountered constraints such as lack of participants due to COVID-19
and the timing, on December was almost the end of the academic calendar with final
classes and students having mostly online classes. Also, the sample size is related to the
power-efficiency, and in this study, the power was around 26% or less, indicating that not
rejecting the null hypothesis could be because the lack of size sample. Moreover, because
this experiment was a BS, it is more expensive and required a more significant number
of participants to get the same power-efficiency as in a within-subject design (Bellemare
et al., 2016).
Nonetheless, in future sessions, I would include at least one more period to gather
more observations from both sides, and in that period the Bernoulli Distribution should
be used to give the firm a signal about the worker’s productivity using the number of tasks
performed or even after choosing the effort level. This may solve the fact that a one-shot
game experiment is likely to be ineffective to find statistical discrimination.
Furthermore, the encryption task was part of the experiment but the goal was to see
if workers would honour the non-binding contracts without any impact in their earnings.
I would eliminate the possibility of reject offers, if tasks are linked to earnings through
the Bernoulli Distribution, it could improve the effectiveness of the signal of productivity.
Additional, the strategy method should be used for workers too to get also their relation
effort-wage.
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It would be interesting to run this study, including these changes and narrowing the na-
tionality for the firm, the locals and the immigrants workers. It would also be interesting to
consider different characteristics, such as refugee status, gender and skin colour. I imag-
ine the result may vary depending on how subjects perceive immigrants, and if they are
more or less prejudiced against immigrants and what it means to be a national/immigrant
from a country or another. Lastly, I would also explore the possibility to introduce the
dual labour market hypothesis, then the difference between fair pay and unfair pay be-
tween local and immigrant sector jobs can be seen as the difference between wages above
market-clearing and wages at market-clearing (Akerlof, 1984). Indeed, the Bernoulli Dis-
tribution’s primary intention was to allow participants to classify both types of workers.
Finally, sometimes focusing on the optimisation to maximise welfare, forgetting that
the production factor called "Labour" consists of people, with feelings, beliefs, prefer-
ences and souls. It is good to keep it simple and contribute to harmonise several con-
cepts that should guide an immigration policymaker to reflect a “political consensus that
incorporates the conflicting social and economic interests of various demographic, so-
cioeconomic, and ethnic groups, as well as political and humanitarian concerns” (Borjas,
1995).
I hope this contributes to get one more vote for being in pro-immigration not only
in the sense of granting permanent residence for the ‘Best of the Best’ but investing and
growing together as Citizens of the future. After all, there is no statistical significance in
differences in wages, efforts and tasks among participants and if they did not hide their
true preferences, there is no reason to believe that the results should differ from reality
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Welcome to the study!
Please, put your phone on silent mode, and do not communicate with anyone in the
room. If you need help, raise your hand, and the experimenter will assist you.
Your role in the study
In this experiment you either act as a Firm or as a Worker (i.e. local or immigrant).
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly assigned one of these roles and
it will not change during the experiment. You will earn points expressed as Experimental
Currency Units (ECU) that will be converted into Tickets to participate in a Lottery.
Procedures
The experiment consists in one round, where you will be randomly and anonymously
matched with other subjects. Each Worker is matched with one Firm and each Firm has
two workers (i.e. local and immigrant). You will not know whom you are matched with.
The round has three stages plus a questionnaire.
First stage:
Workers choose an effort level and the Firm will offer a wage for each Worker.
If you are a Worker you should know that your decision is independent of the other
Worker’s decision. There are ten different effort levels workers may choose. The lowest
possible effort level is 1 and the highest is 10. Choosing an effort level is costly for
workers. The higher the effort level, the higher the corresponding costs. However, the
costs only depend on the effort level a Worker chooses for himself. The effort level
chosen by the other Worker does not affect your costs.
As a Worker, you must choose which effort level you wish to provide for the possible
wage set by the Firm. The effort level should be integers and in between one and ten. The
costs (in ECU) for a particular level of effort are reflected as follows in Table A.1:
Effort Level e (units) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cost in (ECU) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 13 16 20
TABLE A.1: Cost of Effort
41
LUÍS ESTEVÃO GONÇALVES GARCÍA ARE YOU A DISCRIMINATOR?
If you are a Firm, you will offer a wage for each Worker. There are 21 possible wages
(ranging from 20 until 120) because wages offers will be multiples of 5, so each Firm has
to make ten wages offers.
Keep in mind that workers may have Lower or Higher productivity Z, which has a
Bernoulli Distribution Z ∼ Be(0.5). This means 25% probability to get both workers
with lower productivity, 50% probability to get one lower productivity worker and other
with higher productivity, and 25% probability to get both workers with higher productiv-
ity.
Second stage:
Workers Accept or Reject the offer. If s/he accepts, can work by solving a task. If the
Worker rejects the offer, s/he will go directly to the Questionnaire.
Third stage:
In the last two minutes Workers can:
1. Solve a task
2. Do something else they wish, like browsing the internet or checking their mobiles
(without communicating with others in the room or making noise).
Firms can:
Use the two minutes as they wish (without communicating with others in the room or
making noise).
Questionnaire
You will be asked to fill in a questionnaire regarding your socio-demographic status
and sensitive data. Remark that your data is anonymized.
Earning points
During the experiment you will earn ECU based on the choices you and the partici-
pants with whom you are matched made.
After the experiment, the amount of ECU will be converted into Tickets at the follow-
ing Exchange rate:
10 ECU = 1 Ticket
The Earnings are given by:
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• Firm:
Your Profit = 90 + 10*(Effort level Worker1 + Effort level Worker2)-(Wage1 +
Wage2), if Wage Offer is Accepted.
Your Profit = 90 + 10*(Effort level Worker 1 OR Worker2)-(Wage 1 OR 2), if Wage
Offer is Accepted only by one worker.
0, otherwise.
• Workers:
Your Income = 90 + Wage - Cost of worker’s Effort, if Wage Offer is Accepted.
0, otherwise.
For example, each unit of effort exerted by a Worker produces 10 ECU for the Firm.
For instance, if the effort level is 1 the Firm will receive 10 ECU, if the effort level is 2
the Firm will receive 20 ECU, and so forth. If the effort level is 10 the Firm receives 100
ECU.
Remark:
1. Cost of worker’s Effort is provided in Table A.1.
2. If you are a Firm you begin with an initial Endowment of 90 ECU. If you are a
Worker, you begin with an initial wealth of 90 ECU. It increases if you make profits and
it decreases if you experience losses in the experiment. Note that you can always rule out
the possibility of making losses by your own decisions.
The End
At the end of the session, please introduce the Number of your working station in the
form’s fields (i.e number C0XX) and wait at your desk until the Experimenter ask you to
come to receive your payment. After the experiment, please leave all the documents the
Experimenter handed out to you in the place you were assigned.
Please also note that you must not talk to the other participants during the experiment.
In this case, we need to abort the experiment immediately and you must leave the room
and no fee will be honoured. If you have any questions please raise your hand and the
Experimenter will answer them personally.
Thank you for your participation and Success!
B EXIT QUESTIONNAIRE
This is a summary of the Questionnaire.
43
LUÍS ESTEVÃO GONÇALVES GARCÍA ARE YOU A DISCRIMINATOR?
Page 1: Demographics
1. Sex of respondent; 2. Can you tell me your year (YYYY) of birth, please?; 3.
How many children do you have ?; 4. Please select your Race; 5. What is the highest
educational level that you have attained?; 6. Please, select the Languages you are fluent
or native.
Page 2: Religiosity and Political Preferences
7. Which is your level of religiosity?; 8. Do you belong to a religious denomination?;
9. Which (political) party appeals to you most?.
Page 3: Beliefs and Preferences
10. We would like to know your opinion about the people from other countries who
come to live in your country - the Immigrants. How would you evaluate the impact of
these people on the development of your country?;
11. Please look at the following statements and indicate where you would place your
views on the scale 1 to 10?; 11a. 1-Immigrants take jobs away from the locals-Natives
or 10-Immigrants DO NOT take jobs away from the locals-Natives, 11b. 1-Immigrants
make crime problems worse or 10-Immigrants DO NOT make crime problems worse;
11c. 1-Immigrants are a strain on a country’s welfare system or 10-Immigrants are NOT
a strain on a country’s welfare system, 11d. 1-It is better if immigrants maintain their
distinct customs and traditions or 10-It is better if immigrants DO NOT maintain their
distinct customs and traditions.
Page 4: You were a Firm. Who is the immigrant? 12. From where is likely to be the
immigrant worker?




Files available under request at:
garciagon.luis@aln.iseg.ulisboa.pt
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D COMMUNICATION AND RECRUITMENT CAMPAIGN
D.1 ORSEE
The main recruiting tool was ORSEE. Together, 735 invitations were sent and 39
participants attended in 8 sessions held at XLAB. In total, eleven sessions were scheduled,
two were dropped and one session cancelled. The Rate of Response: 5.3%.
D.2 Mail Invitation
Dear All,
I want to invite you to participate in the Experiment related to my Master Dissertation.
The purpose of this study is to investigate how people make decisions in a context of
wages and efforts.
You will be asked to do some simple tasks and answer some questions. The Experi-
ment will take place at XLAB –ISEG (Room 206, Second Floor 2, Building Francesinhas
2) in December 9, 10 and 11 of 2020 in several daily sessions. It will take approximately
45 minutes and you will receive tickets to participate in a Lottery to win a gift card (Cartão
Dá).
You also can watch the video on Youtube! in https://youtu.be/EKbERJbo4-k
To participate: First, please Register yourself as a Participant in the XLAB Site:
http://xlabonline.com/participants/ and send an email to passda.xlab@gmail.com to re-
ceive your invitation! First, Please Register yourself as Participant in the Second, choose
a day and a Group in which you want to participate.
Third, there are a limited amount of places, so make sure to register as soon as possi-
ble!
Four, please invite your friends!
If you have any question regarding your participation, you can send me an email to
garciagon.luis@aln.iseg.ulisboa.pt
I am looking forward to seeing you!
Kind regards, Luís
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D.3 Video
To complement the ORSEE recruitment process, I designed a campaign to augment
the number of participants and an email invitation. The Invitation video is available on
Youtube. Click Here!
E THE PRIZE AND THE LOTTERY
I created a Lottery as the mechanism of reward. Participant received tickets as pay-
ment for their performance.
The Tickets were random numbers generated using the site of RAMDOM.ORG.
Remark that Higher the profits, Higher the number of tickets earned, with a minimum
of 9 tickets. Also means that Higher the number of tickets, Higher the possibilities to earn
the Lottery.
The winner Ticket number was selected using the same site, and the XLAB’s Lab
Manager informed all participants the date of the prize draw. It was held on December 16
at 14:00 at XLAB. One participant attended, and the Lab Manager acted as witness.
The prize given was a Gift Card of 100 EUR. The gift card brand used was a Cartão
Dá and The Winner picked up the card on December 18.
F WHO IS THE IMMIGRANT?
In this sample, Brazilians were considered the immigrant group by participants in
53% of the cases, and the second group was Indians with 14%. Indeed, Brazilian in
2018 represented almost 22% of the foreigner population in Portugal and Indians 2.4%,
according to the report “Resident Foreign Population in Portugal” by the Gabinete de
Estratégia e Estudos (GEE, 2020).
G TABLES
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TABLE G.1: Theories of Discrimination: Overview
Theories of Discrimination
Author Type of Discrimination Characteristics
Becker 1971
Trait: race, religion, sex, colour, social class
and personality.
Coefficient of discrimination.
Perfect substitutes or perfect complements
Taste for Discrimination Existence of non-pecuniary and physics costs.
Ignorance may cause discrimination
and contact may eliminate it.
Employers, Employees, Government,
Consumers and Market discrimination.
Arrow 1973
Trait: racial discrimination.
Statistical Discrimination Differences in productivity. Assumptions
of utility and profit-maximization.
Nonconvexities in indifference surfaces
and opportunities. Cost of Adjustment.
Imperfect Information.
Pincus 1996
Trait: Race, Ethnic and Gender
Individual Acts with intention to harm
Also by Small Group of individuals
Institutional Same intentions disguised in social institutions
Forced segregation. Different Groups, different
perceptions about discrimination
Structural Race and gender-neutral in intent
Negative impact on minorities
Lang 2007
Trait: race discrimination.
Prejudice Employer discrimination. Employee prejudice.
Adjustment cost. Customer prejudice.
Prejudice in Imperfect labour market.
Transaction cost Social Distance and language.
Statistical Discrimination Basic Model, on average, is true.
Job matching with comparative and
Absolute advantage. Unobserved Investments,
connections in the labour market.
Self-confirming expectations Stereotypes are true, in the end.
Cahuc et al. 2014a
Trait: Women and Ethnic Minorities.
Taste for Discrimination Perfect Competition: No Discrimination.
Imperfect Competition: 1) Monopsony,
preferences and limited personal mobility.
Lower wages and lower level of employment.
Without competition, discrimination persist.
2) labour market with Frictions. Job search is
costly. Lower wages and Longer
unemployment and Reservation wage decrease.
Expectation lead to self-select low-wage jobs.
Statistical Discrimination A priori estimate of individual productivity
Source of individual discrimination.
Wage decreasing with proportion of efficient
individuals in a group
Source of persistent inequality among groups
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TABLE G.2: Literature Review: Gift Exchange Foundations
Author Theory or Main Topic Subjects Results
Akerlof 1982
Four paradigms: Dual Labour
Market, Search Theory, Partial
Gift Exchange and Pure Mar-
ket Exchange
The Cash Posters and
Women
Labour contracts are partial gift exchange. Par-
tially, wages and workers’ effort are determined
by Norms of workers’ effort
Akerlof 1984
Dual Labour Markets Primary sector Good Conditions/Pay
Secondary sector Poor conditions/Pay
Primary sector firms pay wages they ‘prefer’ in
excess of market clearing. Results are not coun-
terintuitive.
Theory of Bureaucracy Officials Well-specified division of labour
Productivity depends on Employee loyalty.
Theory of work groups Inspectors Formal and Actual authority
Operators ‘Making out at the game’.
Exist Direct Methods of Retaliation. Effort is
e = e(ω; ω̄, u), with ω as real wage, ω̄ as wage of
other workers and u as unemployment rate. Busy
workers with some degree of freedom. Payment
of a Fair Wage and social interactions.
Equity Theory Not Qualified Student Receive anyway the usual rate
Qualified Student Usual rate same as market rate. Overpaid, Fewer
errors and higher output per hour.
Fehr et al. 1998
Gift Exchange Market (GEM) Austrian Soldiers Labour contracts are incomplete
Complete Contract Market
(CCM)
Students Labour contracts are complete
Bilateral Gift Exchange (BGE) Norms of Fairness and reciprocity have a persis-
tent effect on wages and employment. Reciprocal
behaviour is stable and not only make both firms
and workers better off when they relied on it, but
also generates efficiency gains.
Van Der Heijden et al. 2001
Simple and Complex Gift Ex-
change. Repeated Bilateral
Gift Exchange
Player 1 and Player 2. Stu-
dents Tilburg University
Lab Experiment. It looks to examine the impact
on the degree to which players are able to achieve
simple or complex exchanges through comparing
the institutional variables such as matching struc-
ture (partners vs strangers) and move structures
(simultaneous moves vs sequential moves). Six-
teen experimental sessions between March 1995
and April 1996. Higher percentage of NEs in the
stranger treatment than in the partner. Few com-
plex exchanges among strangers, whereas partners
are able to complete substantially more. Not suf-
ficient condition to interact with the same partner
repeatedly. Simple exchanges about the same for
both. Structure move has virtually no impact on
simple or complex exchange. Although, induces
player 1 (make more gifts) and player 2 (make
smaller gifts) to change their behaviour, leading to
rather uneven gains from gift exchange. Complex
requires coordination and are higher to achieve.
Rigdon 2002
Efficiency wage Hypothesis,
the Fair Wage-Effort Hypothe-
sis and Gift Exchange
Undergraduates as Buy-
ers (employers) and sellers
(workers)
The Author tried to see if under (a) a nontriv-
ial marginal cost to providing effort and (b) in-
creased social distance between subject and ex-
perimenter, the behaviour consistent with the Fair
Wage-Effort Hypothesis could emerge and be sus-
tained. Also, real effort is not reported and un-
der a double-blind protocol, no one can identify
the shirkers. Moreover, Employers at first attempt
to achieve more efficient outcomes, but encounter
selfish behaviour by the workers. This indicates an
important frontier to the efficiency wages hypoth-
esis that could be overcome when small institu-
tional changes are introduced. The labour market
in this experiment replicates a natural labour mar-
ket in several aspects, but high level of reciprocal
effort do not follow higher wages.
Charness et al. 2004
Gift Exchange Managers and Employees.
US Undergraduates
Subject characteristics strongly affect behaviour.
It was given a Payoff table that made results to
change. Authors in this experiment suggests that
at least in part, the Gift exchange observed is in-
duced by strategic considerations rather than by
social preferences per se. Framing effect, clarity
effect and marginal effects are the explanation for
this behaviour.
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TABLE G.3: Literature Review: Gift Exchange On-the Lab.
Author Theory or Main Topic Subjects Results
Hannan et al. 2002




The Authors seek to find to what extend
Fehr’s results replicate in the United States.
Their design includes that workers receive
higher than minimum wages without fear
of any punishment when minimum effort
is provided and subjects partially honoured
this nonbinding request. Gift Exchange is
replicated. Undergraduates provide less ef-
fort than MBAs and may be due to work ex-
perience, higher level of cohesion and more
strategic mindset.
Maximiano et al. 2007 Gift Exchange Employer and Worker
The authors investigated whether Bilateral
Gift Exchange could generalize to a realis-
tic situation in which the employer has sev-
eral workers. They compared treatments:
1-1/1-4 (Employer-Workers). Effort lev-
els in 1-4 is marginally lower than in 1-
1. Although employers in 1-4 earned much
more than the worker does, this indicates
that outcome-oriented social preferences by
themselves are not enough to account for
the gift exchange observed in their experi-
ment and that intention-based reciprocity is
a mainspring behind the results. The strat-
egy method is used to elicit the wage-effort
relationship of every individual.
Abeler et al. 2010
Gift Exchange and horizontal eq-
uity
Principal and Agents Authors analyzed how the effectiveness of
gift exchange as a contract enforcement de-
vice change due to horizontal fairness con-
cerns of employees. The used one treat-
ment where the principal pays equal wage
to agents and another where can set an in-
dividual wage for each one. The first, elicit
less effort and more violation of the equity
principle. Equal wages are efficiency de-
creasing and lead to situations where it is
considered unfair by the workforce. Adher-
ence to the norm of equity is prerequisite
for the gift exchange to take place. Look
the benefits and cost of equal wages. Perks
and non-monetary benefits could be used to
motivates workers when wage discrimina-
tion is not possible.
Benndorf and Rau 2015
Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and




The Authors report effects of coworkers in
a repeated reversed gift-exchange game to
an environment with one worker. Their re-
sults replicate Abeler et al. 2010. Thus,
Individual-wage achieve a higher level of
effort than Equal-Wage treatment. Also,
Learning behaviour lead to twofold effects.
Low-performing employees learn from pay-
off information of better-performing em-
ployees and increase effort over time. Equal
wage lead to norm violation when effort dif-
fers from one to another employee, then,
better-performing employees learn and over
time reduce their effort as a consequence.
Jokipalo 2019
Gift Exchange Employers and Employees The Author seeks to investigate the impact
of Basic Income (BI) on wages and produc-
tivity. She added some features: real effort,
real leisure, and repeated game format and
she found that BI policy may motivate em-
ployees to exert more effort, improving pro-
ductivity, but this may lead to employers to
decrease labour demand or decrease wages.
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H EQUILIBRIA PREDICTIONS
In Figure H.1, it is possible to see the profits firms would obtain for all combinations
of wage-efforts, if both workers accept their offers. The negative relation, also supported
by the derivative of Equation 2, ∂πi(w,e)
∂(w1+w2)
= −1, helps to predict that firms should offer













FIGURE H.1: Firm’s possible profits, if both workers accept her offer
Figure H.2 shows possible payoffs workers would obtain for all combinations of
wage-efforts, if they accept firms’ offers. The negative relation, also supported by the
derivative of Equation 3, ∂uj(w,e)
∂ej
= −c′(ej), indicates that workers should offer the low-
est possible effort to maximise their payoffs. Thus, the best reply for workers is to supply











FIGURE H.2: Worker’s possible payoffs
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